The influence of board independence, competency and ownership on earnings management in Malaysia

Nor Hasimah Johari, Norman Mohd Saleh, Romlah Jaffar, Mohamat Sabri Hassan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

25 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper examines the roles of independent members on the board, chief executive officer who also serves as a chairman of the company, board competency and management's share ownership on earnings management practices. Different from prior research, it also investigates whether independent board competency (an interaction of independence and competency) and independent board share ownership (an interaction of independence and management ownership) would lead to better monitoring over earnings management. It also examines whether board competency and share ownership could compensate the missing role of monitoring when CEO duality exists. The results indicate that excessive shareholding beyond 25% by managers may induce managers to manage earnings, and a combined chairman-CEO roles (CEO duality) does not influence the practice of earning management in Malaysian firms. The results also indicate that the minimum composition of one-third independent director, as suggested by the Code of Corporate Governance in Malaysia is not adequate to monitor the management from earnings management practices.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)281-306
Number of pages26
JournalInternational Journal of Economics and Management
Volume2
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 01 Dec 2009

Fingerprint

Malaysia
Board independence
Competency
Earnings management
Ownership
Share ownership
Chief executive officer
Interaction
Monitoring
Managers
CEO duality
Chairmen
Management practices
Management ownership
Corporate governance
Independent directors
Shareholding

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Business and International Management
  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
  • Strategy and Management

Cite this

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The influence of board independence, competency and ownership on earnings management in Malaysia. / Johari, Nor Hasimah; Saleh, Norman Mohd; Jaffar, Romlah; Hassan, Mohamat Sabri.

In: International Journal of Economics and Management, Vol. 2, No. 2, 01.12.2009, p. 281-306.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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